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Summary 
Public-key encryption would seem to be inherently assymmetric. in that only messages sent to a user can be 
encrypted using his public key. We demonstrate that the use of interactive protocols for sending encrypted 
messages enables a symmetric use of public keys; we give cryptographic protocols for the following tasks: 
1. Probabilistic encryption, using the same public key, both of messages that are sent to a particular user 
as well as of messages that the user sends to others, without compromising the key. We propose a 
public-key cryptosystem based on these protocols which has only one key, owned by a cryptographic 
server. 
2. Authentication both of the sender and of the receiver of a probabilistically encrypted message. 
3. Probabilistic encryption which is provably secure against both chosen-message and chosen-ciphertext 
attack. 
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1. Introduction 
As introduced by Diffie and Hellman and further studied by many authors, public-key encryption would seem to 
be inherently assymrnetric: messages sent to user A are encrypted using A's public key [6, 16]. This is true both for 
deterministic [15, 13] and for probabilistic [8, 3, 5] implementations of the Diffie-Hellman model. 
In this paper we suggest that users follow an interactive protocol in order 10 send probabilistically encoded 
messages, and show how this allows the symmetric use of public keys. A's public key will be used to encode 
messages that are sent to A as well as to encode messages that A sends to others, without compromising the key. 
We contrast our protocol with previous interactive schemes, in which public-key encryption was used in order to 
distribute additional private keys that could be used symmetrically by pairs of users [9, 18]; our scheme enables 
symmetric use of the public key itself. 
This capability is useful in a number of cryptographic settings. For example. it enables a casual user who is not 
registered in the central file of public keys to receive a private message. It can also be used in a cryptographic 
network with a trusted central server, through which all messages are routed; here only a single public key is needed 
(cf. [12]). 
We extend our scheme so as to enable the symmetric authentication of an encoded message --- that is, the 
authentication both of the sender and of the receiver of the message. This is the first such scheme, in the setting of 
probabilistic encryption, that uses only the encryption keys. 
Probabilistic encryption was proposed in order to hide from an eavesdropper all partial information about an 
encoded message. However, all of the systems discussed in the literature are vulnerable to chosen-ciphertext attack. 
We give a refinement of our protocol (based on [11)) which is provably secure against chosen-ciphertext attack. In 
addition. we give another symmetric public-key encryption scheme, this one based on a minimum-knowledge 
interactive proof-system. which is also chosen-ciphertext secure [7]. 
2. Background 
In the model introduced by Diffie and Hellman, each user A in a public-key crypto-system has a public 
encryption algorithm E and a private decryption algorithm D. Any other user encrypts a message M that he wishes 
to send to A by computing the ciphertext E(M); only A is capable of computing D(E(M») ~ M to recover the original 
message [15, 13]. In order that the ciphertext reveal no partial information about the message, it has been suggested 
that E and D be probabilistic algorithms [8, 3, 5]. 
We would like A to be able to use her own public key in order to send an encrypted message to another user B. In 
order to do this securely, so that no other users can decrypt the message, it seems necessary to make the transfer of a 
message depend on an interactive protocol between A and B. In this way B can help to choose the random input to 
the probabilistic encryption and decryption algorithms. In the next section we will show how to implement this 
idea; first we sketch the methods of probabilistic encryption that we will use. 
The security of the protocols that we discuss in this paper relies on the existence of hard bits, that is. Boolean 
predicates B for which there is an efficient reduction to B of an assumedly intractable number-theoretic problem. 
Specifically, we will assume that we are given functions of the following form. Let D!:: {a, 1}1I be a (non-sparse) 
set of n-bit strings. and suppose that I: D ~D is a one-way trapdoor pemw.ration. Suppose in addition that 
B: D ~ {a, I} is an (efficiently computable) Boolean predicate such thatr l is efficiently reducible to the "hard 
bit" Bo rl.*(yao has shown that, even without such a predicate,/can be used to generate pseudo-random bits [17].) 
I 
x ~ Y 
B J, I hard bit 
b 
Such a function and its associated Boolean predicate may be used as a cryptographically strong generator of 
pseudo-random bits. Given any elementxE D, and two integmj~k, we will define 
G(x,j,k) 
to be the bit-sequence 
B(ti(x», B(ji+l(x», ... , B(jle{x». 
J 
~ III (x) 
pad(x} = b l 
If elements XE D are chasen at random, then the bit-sequences pad(x}= G(x, l,ns) are indistinguishable (in time 
polynomial in n) from truly random bit-sequences. That is, an efficient algorithm which could distinguish between 
the two sorts of sequences with non-negligible probability could in tum be convened to an efficient algorithm for 
computingr l , contradicting the assumption thatr l is hard. (For a more complete account of this, see [4, 17,2].) 
The provable security of these bit sequences permits us to use them to simulate one-time pads. 
The schema just described is an abstraction of two different methods of pseudo-random bit-generation. That of 
Goldwasser, Micali. and Tong [9] requires an n-bit integer N = pq which is the product of two primes satisfying 
either p=q3i 3 modS, CI' P -q.7 modS. The domain D is the set {XE ZN-' ° <x<NI2, (N) = I}; we define the 
function I by j{x) - ±x2 mod N. choosing either + or - so that ° <fix) <NI2, and we define the predicate 
B : D ~ {a, I} by B(x) '" parity(x). Both I and B can be efficiently computed. The trapdoor information for I is the 
factorization of N; this information enables the efficient computation of <rl)i (5]. The security of the hard bit of 
this scheme was proved by Alexi, Char, Goldreich, and Schnorr [I]. 
-We rmy also have B : D -+ {O. I} Ie, where B is a Ie-bit "predicate" all of whose bill are JimJUlaMoiUly hard. (In this caR, the cryptographic 
applicatioos -- modified in the obvious rmDller - are more efficient by a factor of Ic.) The proofs go through with little change. 
The pseudo-random bit-generator of Blum. Blum. and Shub also involves squaring modulo a large integer N [3]. 
The first probabilistic encryption scheme. due to Goldwasser and Micali [8]. does not use a pseudo-random 
bit-generator; instead. each bit of a message is encoded either as a random quadratic residue or as a random 
quadratic non-residue modulo a large integer N which is the product of two primes. More precisely. a public key in 
this scheme consists of N together with y, a quadratic non-residue mod N with Jacobi symbol + 1. To encode a bie. 
one chooses x E ZN· at random and sends either xl mod N (a random residue) or yxl mod N (a random non-residue), 
according to whether the bit is 0 or 1. For any bit-string s, we will use EN (s) to denote the set of possible 
,J 
encodings of s; thus, if s has length I then EN (s) consists of I-tuples of residues and non-residues mod N. Gaining 
,J 
any panial information about an encoded message is as hard as distjnguishing residues from non-residues mod N, 
which appears to be an intractable problem without knowing the factorization of N. The trapdoor information which 
enables efficient decoding is exactly this factorization. 
3. Symmetric Encryption Scheme 
We describe here how to encode and decode. using a cryptographically strong bit-generator constructed with a 
trapdoor function as described above. 
Let / be the trapdoor function whose specification is contained in user A's public me; that is, all users in the 
network can compute/quickly, but only A has the trapdoor information enabling her to computerl. Generalizing 
the scheme of Blum and Goldwasser [5], we show how any other user B can send an encrypted message to A using 
/; we then describe how --- using the same function/ -- A can send a securely encrypted message to B. 
In both cases, the c1eartext being sent is an I-bit message M (where I is polynomial in It.) For any element XE D, 
we will use the notation pad(x} = G(x, I,/). 
Protocoll 
In the 'forward' or usual direction. B chooses an element;c E D at random. and computes pad(x}, C = pad(;c) e M, 
and X = j+ 1 (;c). B sends to A the encryption of M, namely the pair [C, XJ. A can decode by computing;c = rl+I)(X) 
and ce pad(;c) =M. 
Encrypting messages in 'the opposite direction seems to require some additional communication. We propose the 
following protocol fer A to send the message M to B. 
Protocol 2 
• A -+ B: "Hi" 
• B chooses;c at random in D, 
and computes pad(x) andX =J'+I(;c} 
• B -+ A:X 
• A computeS ;c=rl+l)(X), pad(x), 
and C = pad(x} e M 
• A -+ B: C 
• B computes C EB pad(x) - M 
!..J 
I 
Notice that the information that is available to the eavesdropping adversary, namely X (which serves as an 
encoding of the seed x) and C, is the same in both protocols. 
Under known-message attack, the present scheme is as secure as the problem of invertingf. To be more precise, 
assume that an eavesdropper witnesses polynomially many executions of one or both of the above pr()(ocols 
(polynomial in 11), and that he knows the message Mj that was sent in the ith execution (either sent by user Bj to A. 
following Protocol 1, or sent by A to user Bj , following Protocol 2). Suppose that, after some polynomially bounded 
computation, the eavesdropper is able either (a) to correctly simulate the behavior of A in order to send a message of 
his (the eavesdropper's) choice; or (b) to decode (with probability non-negligibly better than 112) one bit of the next 
message that A sends or receives. Then our eavesdropper must be able to computer l quickly. The proof relies on 
the (polynomial-time) indistinguishability of the pseudo-random bits of pad(x) from truly random bits. 
We now show how the bit-by-bit probabilistic encryption scheme of Goldwasser and Micali can also be adapted 
so as to encode messages either to or from the owner ofa public key. Let user A have the public key (N,y). 
As in the original scheme, user B can send a message M to A by probabilistica1ly computing an element 
e E EN (M) and sending it to A. Knowing the trapdoor information, A can recover M from e. We will call this 
,'1 
Protocol 1·. 
In order for A to send an I-bit message M to B, the two users execute the following pf()(ocol. 
Protocol 2· 
• A ~ B: "Hi" 
• B chooses p E {O, I}' at random. 
and probabilistically computes e E EN.y(P) 
• B ~ A: e 
• A computes pandC-pEBM 
• A ~ B: C 
• B computes CEBp-M 
As before, ProCDcoI2· is as secure as encryption in the usual direction. 
3.1. Applicatiom 
An immediate application of these protocols is to allow encoded messages to be sent to casual users in a network 
without requiring that they undergo any special procedure such as having a key registered in a public-key library. 
If a network includes a trusted central server, then any message can be sent via the server, encoded using the 
server's public key; when A wants to send a message to B, she sends it to the server using Protocol 1, and the server 
sends it on to B using Protocol 2. In this case, only a single public key is needed; there is no need to initialize and 
maintain a public-key library. This may increase the security of the system and decrease its cost 
We observe that if this suggestion is implemented using bit-by-bit probabilistic encryption, i.e. with Protocol 1 * 
and Protocol 2*, then it is easy to prove that an adversary gains no advantage whatsoever from over-hearing (what 
he knows to be) two encryptions of the same message. 
4. Authentication 
What has been presented so far is purely an encryption scheme. We now assume that each user has his own 
public key, and we consider the problem of user authentication. 
We distinguish two authentication problems that arise when A sends a message to B. There is the problem of 
sender authentication, which is to convince B that it was indeed A who sent the message, and the complementary 
problem of receiver authentication, which is to convince A that it is indeed B who received the message. 
In the usual public-key encryption scheme, in which messages to user A are encrypted using A's public key, 
receiver authentication is assured by the fact that only A knows the private key which is necessary for decryption; on 
the other hand, there is no automatic provision for authenticating the sender of a message. A malicious user C can 
send a message to A, claiming to be B. 
In a standard detenninistic public-key scheme. the usual modification to assure sender authentication is by means 
of a "digital signature", specifying that the message be funher encrypted using the sender's private key; that is, B 
encrypts his message M to A as DeE A (M) [6]. On the other hand, of the several proposed probabilistic public-key 
schemes. none seems to allow for an easy modification that assures sender authentication. 
In our scheme. whereby A sends messages to others using her own public key. the authentication problems are 
correspondingly reversed. Sender authentication is guaranteed by the fact that only A knows the trapdoor 
information (for inverung /) which is necessary for encryption, while receiver authentication is no longer assured. 
That is, a malicious user C can masquerade as B in an execution of Protocol 2. since the only secret information in 
the scheme is that of A. 
We suggest that a simple modification of the protocols presented in the last secton allows A to send M to B so 
that both A and B can authenticate their identities to each other. Let/A.fe denote the public encryption functions for 
users A and B, and let D A' De be their domains. In the following protocol for A to send an authenticated I-bit 
message M to B, pad(x) and pad(y) are computed using fA and/e. respectively. 
Protocol 3 
- A -+ B: "Hi. this is A sending a message to B." 
- B chooses .x at random in D A' 
and computes pad(x) andX :/Ai+ 1 (.x). 
-B-+A:X 
- A computes .x""/A -{i+l)(X), pad(.x), 
chooses y at random in DB' 
computes pad(y), Y -fBI+I(y), andC =MEBpad(x)$pad(y) 
• A ~ B: [C, y] 
• B computes y-fs -{1+1)(y), pad(y), 
andCEBpad(x)$pad(y) -M 
As with Protocols 1 and 2. this protocol is secure against known-message attack. Moreover, impersonating A or 
B is as hard as invertingfA orfs' respectively. 
s. Chosen-Ciphertext Security 
In a chosen-ciphertext attack, the adversary is allowed to have a ciphertext of his choice decrypted. Several 
proposed cryptosYStems which are secure against weaker sorts of cryptanalytic attack are easily seen to be 
vulnerable to the chosen-ciphertext attack. In this section we show how introducing interaction to the cryptosystem 
enables us, for the first time, to achieve provable security against this attack. 
For an example of the chosen-ciphertext attack, consider Protocol 2 specified above. B, the receiver of the 
message, can cheat in the following way. Instead of choosing x at random in D and continuing with the protocol. B 
chooses an elementyeD, setting X-rl(y)-/+I(x), where now x is an element which he does not know. 
However, B does know all but the first bit of pad(x). A, suspecting nothing amiss, sends B the encryption 
pad(x) EB M, all but the first bit of which B can easily decode. If the context of the message allows B to infer the 
value of that fIrst bit, then he has learned the value of the hard bit b l .B-rl(y) of a number y of his choice. Since 
our original assumption was that invertingf is efficiently reducible to B-rl, this is a successful attack. 
,J, ,J, 
pad(x) -
~ ... ~ 1-2(y) ~ X -j-I(y)-I+I(x) 
,J, 
With the implementatioo Using the bit-generator of Goldwasser, Micali, and Tong (see section 2), we now show 
how to refme Prococ:ol 2 so that the resulting scheme is chosen-ciphertext secure. This refinement, based on the 
work of [11], is due to Silvio Mica~L 
Protocol 4 
• A ~ B: "Hi" 
• B chooses atrandomx.xi'~' ... ,x" in ZN*' 
andcomputespad(x),X-I+l(x),andX .• /+I(x.) (i=I, ... ,n) , , 
• B ~ A: X,Xj (i-I, ... ,n) 
• A ~ B: a random subset S c {I, ... , n} of size nJ2 
• B ~ A: {x·liE S} and {.rc.modNlje S} 
, J 
• A checks thatj+l(x.) ",X.fori E S andj+1 (.rc.) aXXmod N for je S: 
, , J J 
if so then A ~ B: M E9 pad(x), 
otherwise A halts (detecting cheating) 
This protocol is secure against an eavesdropper: furthermore, it is secure against chosen<iphertext attack by 
B. The protocol ensures that if A does nO( halt the transaction, detecting cheating, then with very high probability B 
has not cheated. In fact. the refinement may be regarded as a protocol during which B proves to A that he knows the 
number x, without gaining any additionallmowledge -- for example, about the integer N. (Such a protocol is called 
a minimu.m-Icnowledge inleractive proof sySlem [11, 7].) 
The same protocol will work. mulatis mUiandis, as long as D is a group (in which we can compute efficiently) 
and f is an automorphism of the group. 
We now sketch another solution to the problem of the chosen<iphertext attack. In order to avoid any chance that 
A's public key be compromised by B's clever choice of random input to a probabilistic encryption protocol. we 
require that A choose the input: we proceed as follows. The solution has two stages. In the first stage, A chooses a 
sequence of random bits and transmits them one by one to B: these transmissions, of course, must be 
cryptographically secure. This can be accomplished by means of the minirnum-Imowledge protocol introduced in 
[7]; following this protocol, A can prove to B the value of a Boolean predicate in such a way that no eavesdropper 
can tell whether that value is 0 or 1. and so that B gains no additional knowledge at all. In the second stage, the 
sequence of bits can be used as the seed for a pseudo-random bit-generator; in this way, A and B simulate a shared 
one-time pad (of length polynomial in the length of the seed exchanged in the first stage). 
6. Conclusions 
By extending the capabilities of public-key encryption, we have demonstrated the power that interaction adds to 
the capabilities of cryptographic systems. Funher study of interactive protocols promises to be of great use to 
cryptography. We take note here of the work of Rackoff in rigorous modeling of cryptosystems. including 
interaction [14]. 
The problem remains open of specifying a cryptosystem which does flOt use interaction and proving it secure 
against chosen<iphertext attack. Perhaps a first step in this direction would be to allow some sort of limited 
interaction. For example, in the signature scheme of [10], which is secure against the analogous attack. the 
dependence of any signature on the history of previously signed messages (or on a random· function construction) 
may be regarded as an insWlCe of interaction with that history (or with the random· function generator). 
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